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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution,
Utah Code Ann. SS 78-2-2 (3) (e) (i i) and 63-46b-16 and Rule 14 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE 1
A.

Issue:

Is the sale of BJ-Titan Services Company's

oil and gas well stimulation services incidental to the sale of
tangible personal property?
B.

Standard of Review:

Correction of error with no

deference to Commission interpretations.

Chris & Dick's Lumber

and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).
ISSUE 2
A.

Issue:

Do the services BJ-Titan Services Company

provides with respect to "cementing" of oil and gas wells make it
a real property contractor subject to payment of sales taxes on
the cement it purchases at wholesale rather than the collector of
sales taxes on cement it sells at retail?
B.

Standard of Review:

Correction of error with no

deference to Commission interpretations.

Chris & Dick's Lumber

and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).

ISSUE 3
A,

Issue:

Is the transfer of motor vehicles from BJ

Hughes Holding Company to BJ-Titan Services Company an "isolated
or occasional" sale, and thus outside the scope of

a taxable

"retail sale" as defined in Utah Code S 59-15-2(5) (1985-1989)?
B.

Standard of Review:

deference to Commission

Correction of error with no

interpretations.

Chris & Dick's Lumber

and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).
In the alternative to Issue 3f BJ-Titan Services Company asserts the following:
ISSUE 4
A.

Issue:

Is there "substantial evidence" to support

the Commission's Finding that the "aggregate rule" for taxing the
transfer of motor vehicles did not exist?
B.

Standard

of

Review:

with no deference to Commission

Substantial

findings.

evidence

test

Hurley v. Board of

Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527
(footnote

3)

(Utah 1988);

Pickering v. Board of Education of

Township High School District,
(1968).

391 U.S. 563, 578

(footnote 2)

See footnote 1 to the Docketing Statement.
If the Court rules in BJ-Titan Services Company's favor

on Issue 4 then it should decide the following:
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ISSUE 5
A.

Issue:

Can the Commission lawfully disregard the

"aggregate rule" as practiced by its Auditing Division and Motor
Vehicles Division without promulgating a contrary rule pursuant
to the Utah Rulemaking Act?
B.

Standard of Review:

Correction of error with no

deference to Commission interpretations.

Chris & Dick's Lumber

and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
For the years at issue in this proceeding, Utah Code
S 59-15-4 (1985-1986) provides in relevant part:
From and after the effective date of this act
there is levied and there shall be collected
and paid:
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of
tangible personal property made within the
state of Utah. . . A
Utah Code S 59-15-2(2) (1985-1986) defines "sale" or
"sales/ in relevant part, as follows:
(2) "Sale" or "sales" includes installment and credit sales, every closed transaction constituting a sale, and also includes
the sale of electrical energy, gas, services,

1

See Utah Code S 59-12-103 (1990-1991) for the current text of
the statute.
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or entertainment tangible under the terms of
this act. 2
Utah Code $ 59-15-2(5) (1985-1986) provides in relevant
part:
[B]ut the term "retail sale" is not intended
to include isolated nor occasional sales by
persons not regularly engaged in business,
. • . but no sale of a vehicle of a type
required to be registered under the provisions of the motor vehicles laws of this
state shall be deemed isolated or occasional
for the purposes of this act, except that any
transfer of any motor vehicle in a business
reorganization where the ownership of the
transferee organization is substantially the
same as to the ownership of the transferor
organization shall be considered an isolated
or occasional sale.3
Utah Code

SS 59-15-2 and 59-15-4

865-1S, 865-2S, 865-26S, 865-27S, 865-38S

(1985-1986), Rules
and 865-58S of the

Administrative Rules of the Utah State Tax Commission, applicable
in this matter, are set forth in their entirety in Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
t.

NATURE OF CASE.
This is a petition for review by BJ-Titan Services Com-

pany ("BJ-Titan") from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Final Decision ("Final Decision") of the Utah State Tax Commission

(the

"Commission"),

dated

July

2, 1990

(Appeal No.

2

See Utah Code S 59-12-102(8) (a) (1990-1991) for the current
definition of "retail sale."
3

See Utah Code S 59-12-104(14) (1990-1991) for the current text
of this provision which has been recodified as an exemption.
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88-1644), holding that BJ-Titan failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that (1) its oil and gas stimulation services
are exempt from sales and use tax and (2) the transfer of motor
vehicles from BJ-Hughes Holding Company to BJ-Titan was exempt
from sales and use taxes.
II.

Record at 63.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
This

proceeding

is

a

consolidation

of

two

cases:

Hughes Tool Company v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission, Appeal No. 88-1500 and BJ-Titan Services Company v.
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal No.
88-1644.

The nature of the issues in both of these appeals is

the same, except that the Hughes Tool Company appeal does not
involve the "isolated or occasional sales" or "business reorganization" issue present

in BJ-Titan Services Company.

Record at

53-54.4
On February
Hearing.

21, 1989,

the Commission

held

a Formal

At the Formal Hearing, BJ-Titan argued that its cement-

ing, fracturing and acidizing services were non-taxable service
transactions

independent

of and not

tangible personal property.

incidental to the sale of

Alternatively, BJ-Titan argued that

it was a real property contractor because it converted tangible
personal property into real property pursuant to its service contracts.

Accordingly, the non-material (service) portion of the

service

contracts

represent

non-taxable

4

services.

Second,

Accordingly, the facts and legal arguments set forth herein
equally apply to Hughes Tool Company.
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BJ-Titan argued that the creation of a new business entity to
carry out the same line of business being conducted by its incorporators

(1) qualifies

as

an

"isolated

or

(2) falls within a reasonable and logical

occasional

sale";

interpretation

of a

"business reorganization"; or (3) the Commission failed to follow
established procedure of taxing business reorganizations

on an

"aggregate" basis.
III. DECISION OF THE COMMISSION.
On July 2, 1990, the Commission entered its Final Decision, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B.
Final

Decision

the Commission

ruled

that

BJ-Titan

establish by a preponderance of evidence that

"failed

Record

The Commission ruled that BJ-Titan's stimulation services

constituted the sale of tangible personal property.
60-61.

to

its oil and gas

stimulation services are exempt from sales and use tax."
at 63.

In its

Record at

Additionally, the Commission ruled that BJ-Titan was not

a real property contractor.

Record at 61-62.

Finally the Com-

mission held that BJ-Titan did not qualify for the isolated or
occasional sale exemption because

"it cannot be said that the

ownership of the transferee organization

(BJ-Titan) is substan-

tially the same as the ownership of the transferrer organization
(BJ-Holding Company)" pursuant to Rule 865-19-38S.

Record at 63.

The Commission also rejected BJ-Titan1s argument that
in not following the "aggregate theory" the Commission was impermissibly

changing

rejected

the

its

policy.

testimony of

In

a former
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so

ruling

Assistant

the

Commission

Director

at the

Commission as insufficient evidence to establish that such a policy existed.
IV.

Record at 63.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1.

BJ-Titan

provides

a

full

range

of

primary

and

remedial oil and gas well stimulation services for well owners
and operators throughout the United States and Canada.
134.
be

Record at

The well stimulation services which BJ-Titan provides may

generally

subdivided

into

three

hydraulic fracturing and acidizing.
2.

basic

types:

cementing,

Transcript ("Tr.") 70.

The purpose of performing well stimulation ser-

vices is to improve and enhance the production of a well through
various "flow improvement mechanisms."

Tr. 40, 72.

These flow

improvement mechanisms are analogous to creating a lateral well
bore.

Id.

BJ-Titan1s customers are primarily interested in pur-

chasing a result - improved well performance - rather than the
materials, such as chemicals, used to achieve that result.

Tr.

138.
3.

Approximately 8% of the services involved in the

audit deficiencies issued against BJ-Titan are of the hydraulic
fracturing and acidizing types.

Tr. 35.

Hydraulic fracturing

involves the injection of various hydraulic fluids into the well
bore that are treated with various additives that often include
"propping agents" - small spherical man-made and natural components - which extend the well bore laterally into the geographic
formation.
turing.

Tr. 71.
Chemicals

Acidizing is an extension of hydraulic fracare pumped

into the well bore to dissolve
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channels in the rockr plug channels, or remove scale deposits.
Tr. 72.

Fracturing and acidizing involve the application of var-

ious sophisticated and specialized techniques that vary with each
individual well.
and

acidizing

Tr. 71.

Many decisions relating to fracturing

are made on location.

Tr. 78.

See Exhibit 1

(Record at 133-158) for a more detailed description of services
rendered in fracturing and acidizing operations.
4.

Approximately 92% of the services involved in the

audit deficiencies
vices.

Tr. 35.

issued against BJ-Titan are "cementing" ser-

The purpose of cementing treatment is to place

various cementing compositions and other slurry compositions at
strategic places in the well.

The most important type of cement-

ing is primary cementing in which BJ-Titan places a cement slurry
in the annular portion of the well between the hole that has been
drilled and the casing that has been run into the well.
Cementing
well

Tr. 71.

requires a variety of specialized techniques.

is different.

Tr. 71.

Every

BJ-Titan Services does not sell

cement per se but sells cementing services.

Tr. 76.

See Exhibit

1 (Record at 133-158) and Exhibit B to Petition for Agency Action
(Record at 373-404) for a more detailed description of services
involved in cementing operations.
5.

Because of the complexity of properly placing the

cement, well pressures, heat, curing time, etc., cementing may
require

a variety

including

of

bentonites,

additives
sodium
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from

any

of

54

metascilicates,

possibilities
lignins

for

retarding agents, calcium chlorides, etc. to ensure proper formation, placement and sealing.
6.
"pay

zones"

Tr. 77.

The basic function of cementing is to isolate the
from

other

zones,

such

Cementing also supports the well.

as

a

To

perform

any

water

zone.

Without cementing, there is a

good chance that the pipe could collapse.
7.

fresh

oil

Tr. 82.

well

stimulation

service

requires much on-the-job technical training, as well as special
classroom

training.

Tr. 68.

The oil well owner or operator

could not perform any of the services BJ-Titan provides because
he does

not

expertise.
Tr. 71.

have
Tr. 41.

the

specialized

equipment,

training

or

the

Much technique goes into every single job.

To perform cementing operations, a knowledge of the well

hole and geological formations is necessary.
8.

Tr. 93.

The cement, once implaced in the well, becomes a

permanent and integral part of the well and cannot be removed, if
at all, without substantial damage to the well.
9.

Tr. 143.

Various devices, such as "float collars," "float

shoe centralizers," "scratchers" and "plugs" which determine the
flow, form and placement of the cement, are placed on the casing
and lowered into the well.

In some instances the well operator

will attach these devices to the casing.

Typically, the oil well

operator lowers the casing into the well.

BJ-Titan always per-

forms the pumping services and always supervises the entire operation.

Tr. 88, 113, 124.

BJ-Titan customers do not, at any

time, physically perform any of the well stimulation services.
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Tr. 92.

Typically, BJ-Titan makes a proposal as to what services

are needed and a decision as to how to proceed, subject to customer approval.
10.

Tr. 103.
BJ-Titan bills its customers for the entire cost

of services rendered and materials provided; however, the separate material and service costs of each invoice are identified as
separate line items in the invoice.
11.

The

service

or

Tr. at 63.

labor

invoices varies with each contract.

component

of

On average, the materials

portion of an invoice is approximately 31 percent.
some

invoices the materials portion

Tr. 168.
Tr. 52.

BJ-Titan1s

Tr. 215.

On

is as low as 8.5 percent.

On others it is higher than the 31 percent average.
The balance of the invoice price would be for the exper-

tise required and services rendered.
12.

BJ-Titan

collected and

remitted sales

tangible personal property sold to its customers.
collect or remit sales taxes for services.
13.

taxes for
It did not

Record at 56.

The Auditing Division did not impose sales taxes

upon well stimulation services prior to the audit of BJ-Titan
being challenged herein.
14.
lished

BJ-Titan

Tr. 154, 155.
is a Texas

general

partnership

estab-

in 1985 by BJ Hughes Holding Company, a subsidiary of

Hughes Tool Company, and Titan Services, a subsidiary of Dresser
Industries, Inc.

In forming BJ-Titan, BJ Hughes Holding Company

and Titan Services each contributed assets, including motor vehicles,

to the newly formed BJ-Titan.
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Tr. 26, 27.

BJ Hughes

Holding

Company

contributed

72% of

the

assets,

including

the

motor vehicles at issue, to BJ-Titan and received a 72% interest
in the partnership.
15.

Tr. 28.

Each of the entities forming BJ-Titan was in the

well stimulation business prior to formation of the partnership.
The business purpose in forming the partnership was to achieve
economies of scale.

BJ Hughes Holding Company contributed the

entire line of business or operations constituting

its oil and

gas well stimulation services.

Afterwards, all stimulation ser-

vices

Holding

conducted

by

BJ

through the partnership.
16.
were

titled

plates.

Hughes

Company

were

conducted

Tr. 28-31.

The motor vehicles contributed to the partnership
and

registered

in Texas

with Texas

apportionment

Tr. at 66.
17.

Prior to 1987, the Auditing Division employed the

"aggregate rule" for taxing the transfer of motor vehicles in a
business

reorganization.

Under

this policy,

the

Commission's

Auditing Division imposed a sales tax on assets transferred to a
partnership based upon the non-contributing partner's equity ownership in the partnership.

For example, if a corporation trans-

ferred a $10,000 vehicle to a partnership in exchange for a 70%
partnership

interest, the partnership would pay sales tax upon

$3,000 rather than $10,000.
18.

Tr. 160, 161.

The Director of the Auditing Division was aware

that the "aggregate rule" was practiced by the Commission.

The

Assistant Director sent a memorandum to the Commission asking for

-11-

clarification of the rule.
226.

Tr. 162, Hearing Exhibit 5, Record at

On September 23, 1987, the Utah Attorney General acknowl-

edged the existence of the "aggregate rule" in an informal opinion but recommended

that

it be changed to the "entity rule,"

which would tax 100% of the transfer in the above example.

Tr.

186, Hearing Exhibit 6, Record at 228.
19.

The Commission never promulgated a rule, issued a

bulletin or made any other official or unofficial announcement
that its policy relating to the taxation of well stimulation services had been changed from no-taxation to taxation, or that the
"aggregate rule" had been replaced by the "entity rule."

Tr.

250.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

SERVICES RENDERED UNDER BJ-TITAN'S WELL STIMULATION OPERATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT
INCIDENTAL TO THE SALE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY.
The Commission erred in ruling that the well stimula-

tion services rendered by BJ-Titan are incidental to the sale of
tangible personal property and thus taxable.

In so ruling, the

Commission also failed to properly construe a taxing statute in
favor of the taxpayer as required by Utah case law.

The record

clearly demonstrates that services rendered in acidizing, fracturing and cementing activities are a significant and substantial
element of BJ-Titan1s well stimulation operations, and are the
essence of what BJ-Titan1s customers bargain for and purchase.
These

services

are

not

incidental
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to

the

sale

of

tangible

personal property, either as a percentage of total contract cost
or required technical expertise necessary to complete a project.
The Commission erroneously applied the case law under
McKendrick v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177
(1959) to the facts of this case.
and thus inapplicable.

McKendrick is distinguishable

In McKendrick, the services rendered were

in conjunction with the manufacture or production of a finished
product.

Direct labor was applied to raw materials and the syn-

thesis of the two resulted
finished product.

in a proportionately more valuable

However, the services rendered by BJ-Titan has

little relation to the manufacture of raw materials into a proportionately

more

valuable

BJ-Titan's operations

finished

is providing

product.

The

essence of

the expertise and technical

know-how for the proper placement and use of chemicals or cement
in various

combinations

and at specific

locations

in a well.

These services include research, modeling, testing and other analytical
ties.
not

services;

i.e., non-manufacturing

service-type

activi-

While additives are mixed in the cement, the mixing does

create

a more

valuable

product.

Instead,

the

decrease or increase hydration as necessary depending
conditions.
concrete.

Once hydration

is complete, the product

additives
on well
is still

Its value has not been increased by the synthesis of

labor and raw material to create a new finished product.
The uncontroverted

facts of this case are similar to

the facts and holding of Hardy v. State Tax Commission, 561 P.2d
1064 (Utah 1977) where this Court recognized that while tangible
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personal property conveyed to dental patients should be taxed,
the knowledge, training and expertise of a dentist rendered to
patients represents services that are not incidental to the sale
of tangible personal property and thus not subject to taxation.
II.

IF SERVICES ARE INCIDENTAL TO THE SALE OF
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY, THEN UNDER UTAH
CASE LAW BJ-TITAN MUST BE A REAL PROPERTY
CONTRACTOR.
With respect to cementing services, BJ-Titan is a real

property contractor because it converts tangible personal property into real property (the placement of concrete into a well).
The

Commission

completely

ignores

the

uncontroverted

record,

especially the fact that BJ-Titan is the party responsible for
the installation of cement

in the oil or gas well, which then

becomes a permanent addition to the real property.

BJ-Titan is

the party hired to place cement in the well and is the last party
who has control over the tangible personal property prior to its
permanent

fixture to real property.

Finally, the Commission's

determination that BJ-Titan is not a real property contractor is
without

merit

or

logic

and

is

arbitrary.

In

concluding

BJ-Titan1s services should be subject to a sales tax, the Commission ruled that BJ-Titanfs services were "a necessary component
of the final product."
under Utah law.

Record at 60.

There

is no such test

The Commission also ruled that it was the syn-

thesis of BJ-Titan's services and the materials which produced a
taxable finished product.
property

contractor

Record at 60.

issue,"

However, on the "real

the Commission

inconsistently

and

blatantly ignores these prior findings to conclude that BJ-Titan
-14-

did not convert the cement or other materials into real property
and thus was not a real property contractor.
III.

THE
CONTRIBUTION
OF
MOTOR
VEHICLES
TO
BJ-TITAN IS AN ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE
AND THUS EXEMPT FROM UTAH SALES AND USE
TAXES.
BJ Hughes Holding Company's transfer of motor vehicles

to BJ-Titan qualifies as an isolated or occasional sale which for
the applicable years falls outside the definition of a "retail
sale" subject to taxation.

BJ Hughes Holding Company contributed

its entire line of business which operated the well stimulation
services to the partnership (BJ-Titan).

Utah case law and Rule

38S states that the sale of an entire business qualifies as an
isolated or occasional sale, except for motor vehicles required
to be titled or registered in Utah.

As set forth in the record,

the motor vehicles transferred to the partnership were titled and
registered

in

Texas

with

Texas

apportionment

plates.

As

interstate commercial vehicles, owned by a non-resident of Utah
and registered in another state, these vehicles are exempt from
Utah
S

titling

41-1-19.

and
Thus

registration
the

requirements.

transfer

qualifies

as

See
an

Utah

Code

isolated

or

occasional sale.
In any event, the contribution of assets to a partnership qualifies as a business

reorganization because BJ Hughes

Holding Company has a substantial continuing proprietary interest
in the underlying business operations of BJ-Titan.
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IV.

THE AUDITING DIVISION FOLLOWED A POLICY OF
TAXING MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSFERS ON AN AGGREGATE BASIS.
In the alternative

to Argument

III discussed

above,

BJ-Titan should be taxed using the "aggregate" rule, by which
sales taxes are imposed on assets transferred to a partnership
based upon the non-contributing
the partnership.

partner's equity percentage in

The Commission

ignored testimony of a former

Assistant Director of its Auditing Division and supporting documentary

evidence

to erroneously

conclude

this

policy

did

not

exist.
V.

THE COMMISSION CANNOT MAKE A CHANGE IN POLICY
WITHOUT A RULEMAKING PROCEEDING.
The Commission cannot reverse the "aggregate" rule to

impose taxes under an "entity" theory without compliance with the
Utah Rulemaking Act.
ARGUMENT
I.

SERVICES RENDERED UNDER BJ-TITAN'S WELL STIMULATION OPERATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT
INCIDENTAL TO THE SALE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY.
Utah Code S 59-15-4 (1985-1986) provides that tangible

personal property and certain services set forth therein are subject

to

taxation.

Clearly

absent

from

Utah

Code

S

59-15-4

(1985-1986) is any reference to services rendered in connection
with the acidizing, fracturing or cementing operations BJ-Titan
provides.

Accordingly, the only instance in which these services

may be subject to the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 (the "Act")
is

if

they

are

rendered

incidental
-16-

to

the

sale

of

tangible

personal property.
5
cannot be taxed.
The
ignores

If these services are not incidental, they

Commission's

the distinction

Final

Decision

either

between an exemption

confuses

or

from sales taxes

(which BJ-Titan does not seek) and a misapplication of the Act to
activities not within its coverage.

The distinction is important

because an exemption assumes that taxation is appropriate but for
the exemption.

A misapplication, as in this case, results when

the Commission applies the Act to sales that are not taxable in
the first instance.
Contrary to the Commission's Final Decision,

BJ-Titan

does not seek an exemption from the imposition of a sales tax;
rather, it contests the applicability of a sales tax on services
not specifically

identified

in the statute, and which are not

incidental to the sale of tangible personal property.

For that

reason, the Commission should have construed the Act liberally in
7
.
.
.
the taxpayer's favor.
It did not.
Rather, ignoring this
requirement, the Commission narrowly construed the applicability

5

See Butler v. State Tax Commission. 13 Utah 241, 367 P.2d
852 (1962) and Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935).
6

The Commission ruled that BJ-Titan's "oil and gas stimulation services are [not] exempt from sales and use tax." (Emphasis added). Record at 63.
7

See Oqden Union Railway and Depot Company v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964); Utah Farm Bureau
Insurance Company v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 421, 347
P.2d 179 (1959).
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of

the Act

against

BJ-Titan

to conclude

that

BJ-Titan

is a

retailer of tangible personal property, contrary to the established record and without statutory authority.

This conclusion

requires a specific finding that the rendition of well stimulation services was incidental to sale of tangible personal property.

The Commission made no such finding.

The Commission's

conclusion is incorrect and not supported by the uncontroverted
record.
BJ-Titan went to great lengths to establish and emphasize the extensive and substantial service element
each well stimulation operation.
from being

incidental.

involved in

The services rendered are far

David Cramer,

a technical manager at

BJ-Titan, gave lengthy testimony as to the extensive research,
technology, testing, modeling, analysis of oil and well conditions, etc. which go into each well operation.
As the key to BJ-Titan operations is the proper placement of cement or chemicals into critical zones in a well, much
of these services revolves around ascertaining the conditions and
parameters of the well body and various pay zones.

It is these

analytical services which represent the knowledge, technology and
expertise that BJ-Titan has to offer and for which it is compensated.

Mr. Cramer's uncontroverted testimony as to the substan-

tial services provided is compelling.

For example, the record

includes the following (Tr. 76):
Q
(By Mr. Miller) Mr. Cramer, do the oil
well owners have the expertise to perform
these services for themselves?
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A
No. Specialized equipment is necessary,
and other technical guidance is very necessary. It's a very specialized business.
Tr. 79 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer):
So it requires a lot of knowledge about the
formation.
You may adequately stimulate a
sandstone with an acid treatment.
You may
destroy it also. So limestones are typically
more frequently acidized . . . .
And, again,
a lot of chemical understanding needs to go
into every acidizing treatment. You need to
get samples of the oil from that well or
nearby well. You have to know about the formation.
Tr. 71-72 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer):
A
Okay.
With our cementing operations,
the express intent of a cementing treatment
is to place various cementing compositions,
fluids, slurry compositions, which we'll get
into at various places in the well . . . .
And there is a variety of specialized techniques that accomplish that. And every well
is a different case.
A lot of technique has to go into every
single job. . . . You have to use various
techniques that are going to vary with each
individual formation to accomplish this.
Tr. 138 (Testimony of Mr. Cramer):
Q
(By Mr. Miller) A follow-up question to
that. If I understand what you just told me,
does that mean that your customer is not buying chemicals but is buying a result; i.e.,
an expanded well bore?
A
Exactly.
That customer in that slide
before was very happy that his well went from
zero to 200 barrels a day.
He was less
interested in the details.
But, of course, the details made everything. It was—you know, a lot of technique
went into achieving that result.
Q
Does it matter to the customer whether
you use chemical X or chemical Y?
-19-

A
As long as it achieves a certain function, it hardly ever matters.
It's usually
our recommendation.
Further citations of the record would establish the
8
same point.
The services referenced above and those further
discussed in the record are the essence of BJ-Titanfs operations.
It is these services for which BJ-Titan is hired and paid.

By no

standard are these services inconsequential or incidental.

For

this reason, on the average approximately 70% (Tr. at 215) of the
contract price for any given job is attributable to the service
element inherent therein.
Ignoring this uncontroverted testimony about the extensive scope and nature of services rendered by BJ-Titan, the Commission ruled that BJ-Titan was a "retailer of tangible personal
property."

Record

at 60.

The Commission

concluded

that

the

chemicals and cement BJ-Titan furnishes were not

incidental to

the services being rendered and should be taxed.

In fact, the

Commission's Final Decision quotes from its Auditing Division's
brief that "the materials without the services to blend them into
the correct product and deliver

it into the property would be

likewise be of for [sic] less value."

Record at 60.

This statement evinces the misapplication of the law in
this case.

While the transfer of tangible personal property may

8

The technical expertise, analysis, operations, and decisions
that go into each well stimulation operation are further
explained and exemplified in Exhibit 1 (Record at 133) and an
Article by Dwight Smith for the Society of Petroleum Engineers on
Cementing. (Record at 373).
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be taxed, services which are not specifically set forth in Section 59-15-4 cannot be taxed, unless they are incidental to the
sale of tangible personal property.
cific

finding

that

Thus there must be a spe-

the services BJ-Titan

renders are

in fact

incidental to the sale of tangible personal property.
The Commission failed to cite any case law, statute or
other relevant authority to support a conclusion that these services are incidental to the sale of tangible personal property.
There was no testimony or evidence presented at the Formal Hearing that these services are incidental.

The Commission made no

specific finding that these services were incidental to the sale
of tangible personal property.

The only finding the Commission

made was that these services were a "necessary component of the
final product."

Record at 60.

Again, this shows an improper

construction and application of the law.
dard ever been used.

Nowhere has this stan-

The proper test is whether the provision of

services is "incidental" to the sale of tangible personal property, not "necessary."

For example, the services to install a

purchased washing machine are taxed not because they are necessary (the washing machine is of little u^e unless installed), but
because they are incidental to the sal|e.

On the other hand,

while the services of an orthodontist are necessary to correct a
patient's overbite, the services are not taxed because they are
not incidental to the sale of the materials used for braces even
though those materials may represent 20-30% of the total cost of
the orthodontic work.

The focus is on whether the services are
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incidental, not the materials.

The value of the materials being

furnished is not pertinent to the proper inquiry.
The Tax Commission made the same mistake its Auditing
Division made at the Formal Hearing.
test.

It did not apply the proper

The Auditing Division's Hearing Memorandum

"petitioner's

transfers

of

tangible personal property

just incidental to the services being provided."
(emphasis

added).

argued that
are not

Record at 298

Once again, the incidental nature

(or lack

thereof) of the transferred tangible personal property vis-a-vis
services

rendered

is not the

issue here. It is the opposite;

i.e., whether those services are incidental to the sale of tangible personal property.

The Auditing Division argued, and the

Commission blindly agreed, that if the sale of the materials is
significant;

i.e.,

"not

just

incidental

to the services being

provided," then the services must likewise be taxed along with
the tangible personal property.

This is flatly wrong.

In Western Leather, Justice Wolfe explained in a concurring opinion what the Commission

and Auditing Division have

failed to realize, or refused to recognize.

That is, if tangible

personal property is so incidental to the sale of services, then
"for practical reasons they [the tangible personal property] cannot be considered a sale."

Western Leather at 530.

However,

services do not become taxable if the cost of material becomes
"non-incidental."

The only time services are taxed is "when an

article is sold and the servicing of the same is incidental to
the sale is such a small part of the price of the whole, such
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value of the services cannot be subtracted from the sale price."
Id. (emphasis added).

Thus the proper focus is on the incidental

nature of services rendered, not the chemicals or cement provided.
taxable.

If these services are not incidental, then they are not
That

is

the

established

law.

On

the

basis

of

uncontroverted evidence, the services BJ-Titan sells comprise on
the average 70% of the entire operation sold.

To deem that inci-

dental, as the Tax Commission apparently does, is ludicrous.
In

an

attempt

to

discount

the

significance

of

BJ-Titan's services, the Auditing Division analogized BJ-Titan's
operations to a ready-mix concrete retailer who does nothing more
in its sale of concrete than show up at a construction site and
pour concrete from a cement truck. Not only is this an inaccug
rate and inappropriate analogy , but the Commission has ignored

9
Calon Anderson likewise testified at the Formal Hearing that
this was not a good analogy (Tr. at 174-175):
A.
They have equated it to a ready-mix
truck that simply backs up to a hole and
dumps the load and drives off. I don't think
this is a very good comparison. I think they
would be more similar, if anything, to a
cement subcontractor.
And there are two
types that I think they might equate to. One
would be a cement contractor who lays out our
interstate highways.
That is quite often
subcontracted out.
They don't put in the
entire interstate.
They do the cement portion of it.
Or they might use the large
machine. They would have a batch plant set
up next to it. They would actually go out
and apply that cement to the road base to
make the freeway that you would drive on.
That would be considered attaching and
converting this cement into rea[l property.
-23-

the economic

reality of

facts of the case.
premium
for

BJ-Titanfs

operations

as well

as the

Why, for example, would anyone pay a 200%

(assuming one-third charge for materials and two-thirds

labor) over

the cost of the materials sold

delivery of cement?

for the mere

The ready-mix company certainly does not

charge, nor would anyone pay, a 200% premium to show up at a construction site and pour concrete out of a truck.

The reason the

customer pays this premium to BJ-Titan is in consideration of the
real and substantial services being performed.

These services

are not incidental to the sale of tangible personal property and
cannot

be taxed unless the Utah Legislature enacts a specific

provision taxing them.

Since the Legislature has chosen not to

enact such a provision, services are not subject to a sales tax.
McKendrick is Inapplicable.
The

Commission's

justification

for

its

decision

is

that BJ-Titan is a manufacturer of finished products and thus a
retailer of tangible personal property.

The Commission held:

It is the synthesis of these two things that
comprise the product, the tangible personal
property and associated services that Petitioner transfers to its customers. It is the
synthesis of material and services that is
subject to sales tax.
10

For example, recognizing that these types of activities are
traditional non-taxable services, Texas enacted a specific occupation tax on oil well stimulation services. See Texas Tax Code
S 191.082 which imposes a tax "on each person who engages in the
business of providing an oil well service for another for consideration . . . ." Section 191.081 defines oil well services or
gas well services as "cementing the casing seat of an oil or gas
well, shooting, fracturing, or acidizing the sands or other foundations of the earth in an oil or gas well . . . ."
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Record at 60 (emphasis added).
In support of this position, the Commission

cited to

McKendrick where this Court held that the manufacture of prosthetic devices was subject to sales tax on the full value of the
finished product.

In McKendrick, the imposition of a sales tax

on the value of the prosthetic device was upheld because the taxpayer was engaged in the manufacture or production of a finished
product for sale.

The Court recognized that any manufacturing

concern in the business of producing a final product will have
labor costs as well as material charges, and that raw materials
may at times be very inexpensive relative to the finished product.

Thus, the relative cost of materials or labor may not be a

relevant inquiry.
The relevant inquiry was whether a finished product was
being produced; i.e., "the process of transformation through various stages
steadily

[wherein] the value

enhanced

in proportion

energy an skill thereon."

[of
to

the finished product] is
the

expenditure

of

time,

McKendrick at 178 (emphasis added).

The Court gave the example of "a pound of iron ore, worth but a
few cents, but which is mined, smelted, processed, tempered and
fabricated into hair springs for watches worth thousands of dollars per pound."
ished product

Id.

The Court then concluded that when a fin-

"is sold its value is that of a finished product

and not of the basic materials from which it was made."
focal

point

of

this

decision

-25-

is

the

conclusion

id.

The

that

the

manufacture of raw materials into a proportionately more valuable
finished product is taking place.
The Commission distorts McKendrick1s

rationale

in an

attempt to tax the entire contract price of BJ-Titan's well stimulation

operations.

The

uncontroverted

BJ-Titan's case easily distinguishable.
vices are not rendered

facts

below

Well stimulation ser-

in the manufacture of raw materials to

produce a proportionately more valuable finished product.
charge

for

research,

services

studies,

is

make

in

compensation

and other

analytical

for

various

services

and

The

testing,
for

the

placement of tangible personal property in a well, not the manufacture of a finished product.
Moreover, McKendrick

is not applicable to the present

case because the chemicals or cement placed in a well is not a
finished product in which "during the process of transformation
through various stages the value is steadily enhanced in proportion to the expenditure of time, energy, and skills thereon."
McKendrick at 178.

For example, there are many different addi-

tives which may be mixed into a cement slurry depending on well
conditions

and desired

placement

of

the

cement

in the well.

These additives enhance, reduce, accelerate or depress the hydration of the cement.
ordinary cement.

However, once the cement hydrates, it is

The hydrated cement is not the result of the

synthesis of labor and materials
more valuable finished product.

to produce

a proportionately

It continues to be just cement.
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It is the placement, not production, of these materials
in the well
BJ-Titan.

which

represent

the

services

being

performed

by

It is these services for which the customer contracts

and pays, and which comprise the major portion of each invoice.
The customer pays for a service, not a finished product.

The

uncontroverted facts are that well stimulation operations do not
involve

the manufacture of

a finished

product.

See

Tummurru

Traders, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 5,
7 (September 19, 1990) (where the Court distinguishes real property contractors from manufacturers).
Consequently,

this

case

is analogous

to Hardy,

not

McKendrick, where this Court recognized that when a dentist furnishes both materials and services, the materials are taxable if
separately stated, but the services are not.
BJ-Titan
For

a customer

needs professional

the dental patient,

In both Hardy and

services or expertise.

a cavity needs filling.

owner, a well needs to be cemented or fractured.

For a well
In both cases

the dentist and BJ-Titan must have special technical expertise to
accomplish

the task.

It is the application of this technical

expertise for which they are being retained and compensated.

In

both cases, a detailed examination of the subject matter is made.
In both cases materials are purchased from third parties which

11

Moreover, as to BJ-Titan1s acidizing and fracturing operations, there is no finished product at all.
The chemicals or
other materials pumped into a well are then pumped out. (See Tr.
137). While in some cases sand or propping agents remain in the
well, once again the material itself is no more valuable than
before insertion in the well.
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will be used in filling a cavity or cementing a well.

Just as

the dentist adds mercury to silver and other metals in mixing an
amalgam to prepare the restorative material for a filling, so too
does BJ-Titan prepare cement or chemicals to be used in cementing
or fracturing
sealings.
tist

and

to likewise ensure proper placement, bonding and

Both perform certain laboratory work.
BJ-Titan

are

responsible

for

Both the den-

and personally

either the amalgam in the tooth or cement in the well.

install
In both

instances, the materials being provided would be of little value
without the services of the dentist or BJ-Titan.
In summarizing Hardy, this Court concluded:
If the above quoted statutes are to be given
effect there seems to be only two alternatives:
the petitioners either (1) itemize
the materials and charge the sales tax
thereon to their patients, or (2) pay the
sales tax on the materials they purchase and
use in rendering their professional services.
Hardy at 1065.
The Court in Hardy recognized that where services are a
substantial and significant element of a transaction, only the
tangible personal property being transferred can be taxed.

In

fact, there is no reference or finding in Hardy that just because
the dentist prepares, mixes or installs materials used in fillings (i.e., the synthesis of labor and materials) that a finished
product is being produced or that the dentist is a manufacturing
concern.
whether

Likewise, there is no test or inquiry in Hardy as to
the

services

were

"necessary"
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for

the

filling

of

a

cavity, although no one would dispute that without the dentist's
services, the materials "are of little value11 to the patient.
In the present case, BJ-Titan provides an itemized bill
to its customers which separately reflects the service portion
and the materials portion of each invoice.

Tr. 63.

Moreover, as

prescribed by the Hardy Court, BJ-Titan collects a sales tax only
on that portion of the invoice related to materials transferred.
Accordingly, based upon Hardy, BJ-Titan1s services are not taxable and BJ-Titan properly collected sales tax on the materials
portion of its billing.
II.

IF SERVICES ARE INCIDENTAL TO THE SALE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY, THEN UNDER UTAH CASE LAW BJ-TITAN MUST
BE A REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR.
Rule R865-58S of the Commission's Administrative Rules

provides, in part, that "the sale of real property is not subject
to the tax nor is the labor performed on real property."

(Empha-

sis added.)
No one disputes the fact that

if BJ-Titan

is a real

property contractor with respect to its well stimulation operations, the labor it renders in the conversion of tangible personal property into real property is not subject to a sales/use
However, the Commission rejected BJ-Titan1s claim that it

tax.
is

a

real

property

contractor,

again

contrary

to

law

and

uncontroverted evidence.
The

Commission's

sole

rationale

for

rejecting

BJ-Titan's status as real property contractor is that BJ-Titan
failed to pay sales tax on materials
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it purchased,

instead of

charging its customer sales tax on materials it sold.
61-62.

This

rationale

wrongly

elevates

form

over

Record at
substance.

Following the Commission's strained logic, had BJ-Titan neither
charged nor collected any sales tax from its well stimulation
operations
tal),

(on the basis the materials furnished were inciden-

the Commission

would

be precluded

from

imposing

a tax

because the form would prevail over substance. 12
The Commission's conclusion that BJ-Titan is not a real
property contractor is short-sighted and arbitrary.

The record

establishes through uncontroverted evidence that the overriding
objective of any well stimulation service is the proper placement
of chemicals or cement at certain critical points

in a well.

BJ-Titan is retained because it has the expertise and technology
to ensure the proper placement of cement and chemicals in a well.
In fact, the Commission specifically found that BJ-Titan performs
cementing

services

which

"involve

the

placement

of

various

cementing compositions, fluids and slurry compositions, into various places in the well."

Record at 54.

With respect to cementing services, no one disputes the
fact

that the cement becomes permanently

property.

The Commission so found.

12

attached to the real

Record at 56.

Likewise, in

Carrying this logic one step further, BJ-Titan (and any
other taxpayer) could now stop paying sales tax knowing that the
form of payment (or lack thereof) will take precedence over the
substance of the transaction. On the contrary, taxing statutes
should be enforced in the opposite manner; i.e., a specific holding should
used on the substance of a transaction, not its
form.
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some

acidizing

and

fracturing

services,

certain

materials

or
13
propping agents become permanently attached to real property.
The Commission also found that without BJ-Titan's expertise, the
cement or chemicals are of little value.

Record at 55.

Finally,

the Commission found that the customer is purchasing the final
product

in

the

hole,

which

"has

value

to

the

customers

of

BJ-Titan only after the materials and services [of BJ-Titan] have
been provided to the customers.n

Record at 55.

Given these findings of fact, it is

incomprehensible

why BJ-Titan is not treated as a real property contractor; i.e.,
the party who converts tangible personal property.

On the con-

trary, having just made all those findings as to how BJ-Titan is
intimately involved in taking raw materials and creating a valuable finished product as placed in the well, the Commission then
makes a finding that

it is the well operator who is the real

property contractor - a party who has no expertise, no equipment,
no capabilities and does none of the actual installation of materials in the well.

This conclusion is grossly in error, contrary

to case law, and the uncontroverted evidence.
In Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n,
101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408, 410 (1942) this Court stated that the

1J

Transcript at 137:
Mr. Pacheo:

Is it pumped back out of the wells?

The witness:
[Mr. Cramer]: Hopefully must do. The sand
gets left in. And what that sand does in effect, it gives you a
lateral well bore. We're creating a lateral flow channel in that
reservoir.
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real property contractor is the party who consumes personal property by converting it to real property:
The paramount question then turns upon the
proposition of whether the contractors to
whom plaintiffs sold their products were
"users" or "consumers" within the meaning of
the act or whether they were mere dealers in
the products reselling to the third parties.
The Court cited to the case law of another jurisdiction, which had a similar taxing statute, and cited with approval
that court's rationale which held that building, paving and sewer
contractors were consumers of materials used to construct edifices and thus were real property contractors.
The court stated that in "its judgment the
contractors in this case did not buy the
materials in question for the purpose of
reselling such materials to the city. They
were under contract to deliver to the city a
finished product.
It was the inseparable
commingling of labor and material that produced a finished product.
14
Utah Concrete at 410 (emphasis added).
The Court also held that the contractors were consumers
because they "are the last persons in the chain [of title] to
deal

with

such products

before

incorporation

into a separate

entity and before such products lost their identity as such."
Id. at 411.

This Court has most recently reaffirmed its holdings

in Utah Concrete in Tummurru Trades, Inc. where it stated:
In distinguishing contractors from manufacturers of other items, the Utah Concrete
court stated:
14

This case is even more relevant to BJ-Titan because part of
the materials referred to above would have included cement used
in the construction of the buildings, paving and sewers.
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[I]n the instant case, contractors purchase
the pipes, culverts and cinder blocks for the
purpose of using and consuming them by incorporating them as one of many units which go
to make up buildings, structures, or roads,
as the case might be, and not for reselling
them as such in their original form, but for
the purpose of changing their very nature
from personal to real property.
In short,
labor and many other materials enter along
with the plaintiffs' products to make up the
particular structure, and they are all used
or consumed in the process of producing a new
entity.
Tummurru at 7 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
Based on these principles, BJ-Titan is a real property
contractor.

BJ-Titan does not buy chemicals or cement for the

purpose of resale.
result,

Tr. 76.

to stimulate

BJ-Titan is contracted to achieve a

flow from a well by placing

chemicals at specific locations in a well.

Tr. 138.

the last party to deal with the materials before
into the well.

Tr. 92.

concrete or
BJ-Titan is
incorporation

The well owner or operator takes no part

in the actual placement of chemicals or cement in ground.
92.

Tr.

BJ-Titan supervises and monitors the installation of cement

in the well and operates all the equipment.

Tr. 85, 89 and 93.

Calon Kay Anderson, a former Assistant Director with
the Commission's Auditing Division, and an auditor for 19 years,
likewise testified that

in his expert opinion, BJ-Titan was a

real property contractor.

Mr. Anderson stated that in auditing

for sales tax liability he focuses on two criteria in determining
status as a real property contractor.

One, "[d]oes it [the mate-

rials] become a permanent part of the realty?"
who

is

"the party

who

actually
-33-

converted

Tr. 176.

that

Second,

property

into

realty?"

Tr. 173.

With

respect

to cementing

services, Mr.

Anderson concluded that BJ-Titan would "certainly be a real property contractor" (Tr. 177):
What sways me to that is that they are performing all of the labor, at least based on
the materials that I have reviewed, they are
performing the labor that converts this
cement into its final product or final form.
In other words, you don't have the owner of
the well coming out and doing additional
things to that cement after it's poured.

Id.
The Commission's

rejection of BJ-Titan's status as a

real property contractor is inconsistent with its own findings.
First, the Commission denies BJ-Titan's claim that its services
are not incidental to sale of tangible personal property by concluding

that

such services

final product," and

are "a necessary

of

the

finding that BJ-Titan has synthesized

its

services and material into a final product.
blatantly ignores this conclusion

component

Then the Commission

(that BJ-Titan's services are

necessary to the production and installation of the final product) and the case law (that real property contractors are not
manufacturers) to avoid a finding that BJ-Titan is a real property contractor.

To conclude that the customer is not purchasing

services, but rather a finished product (where services and materials

are

synthesized)

as

placed

in

a well

(Record

at

55)

requires a conclusion that BJ-Titan is a real property contractor.

Any other conclusion is arbitrary, without logic or merit.
Second, a conclusion that BJ-Titan is not a real prop-

erty

contractor

presumes

that

there was

-34-

no

inter-relation

or

synthesis of labor and material into a final product which therefore requires a conclusion that the services are not incidental
to the purchase of tangible personal property.
conclusions

demonstrate

a

troubling

These unsupported

disregard

of

the

uncontroverted record of the Formal Hearing.
Accordingly, BJ-Titan is entitled to a holding that its
services are not taxable, either because it is a real property
contractor or because its services are not incidental to the sale
of tangible personal property.
III.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES BY BJ
HUGHES HOLDING COMPANY TO BJ-TITAN, A NEWLY
FORMED PARTNERSHIP, IS AN ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE.
Utah Code S 59-15-2(5) (1985-1986) provides that "the

term 'retail sale1 is not intended to include isolated nor occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in business, . . .
but no sale of a vehicle of a type required to be registered
under

the provisions of the motor vehicle

laws of

this state

shall be deemed isolated or occasional for purposes of this act
. . . ."

Rule R865-38S provides, in part:
Any sale of an entire business to a single
buyer is an isolated or occasional sale and
no tax applies to the sale of any assets made
part of such a sale (with the exception of
vehicles subject to registration).

(Emphas i s added.)
In 1985, BJ Hughes Holding Company contributed all of
the operating assets used in its well stimulation operations to a
newly

formed

partnership,

BJ-Titan,

-35-

for

a

72%

partnership

interest.
ing

Likewise Titan Services contributed all of its operat-

assets

to BJ-Titan

respective partnership

for

a 28% partnership

interest.

The

interests are in proportion to the fair

market value of assets and liabilities contributed to BJ-Titan.
15
As this Court has explained in various cases,
and as
set forth in the Commission's own administrative rule, the sale
of an entire business to a single buyer is an isolated or occasional sale.

Note that Rule 38S only requires that there be a

single buyer.

The fact that two separate corporations sold their

separate lines of business to the same entity conducting a joint
operation does not violate the rule.
transaction which stands on

its own.

Each sale is a separate
Nor does the fact that

Hughes Tool Company, the parent corporation of BJ Hughes Holding
Company, operates various distinct and separate lines of business
prevent it from transferring one of those distinct and separate
operating divisions, as an integrated business, and having that
transfer qualify as an isolated or occasional sale.

15

Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209
P.2d 208 (1949); L.A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 23 Utah 2d 84, 457 P.2d 973 (1969) and Husky Oil
Company of Delaware v. State Tax Commission, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah
1976).
!6
See Geneva Steel, where this Court rejected the Tax Commission's argument that the sale to Geneva Steel of an integrated
business was not an isolated or occasional sale because the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation was controlling various separate and discrete businesses and in fact previously sold six
other integrated businesses in Utah. Geneva at 213.
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Apparently, the Commission does not dispute the fact
that this contribution of assets to BJ-Titan qualifies as an isolated or occasional

sale, at

least with

respect

to non-motor

vehicle assets for a sales tax has not been assessed on these
assets.

As to the motor vehicles, the Commission held that the

vehicles required to be titled or registered in Utah were subject
to tax because they were not transferred in a qualified "business
reorganization."

This holding is incorrect for two reasons.

First, the Commission's holding ignores the record and
presumes that the motor vehicles transferred to BJ-Titan were all
required to be registered or titled in Utah, and thus would not
qualify as an isolated or occasional sale unless transferred in a
qualified business reorganization.

However, as Mr. Thomas testi-

fied, the motor vehicles contributed to BJ-Titan are titled and
registered in Texas and have Texas apportionment plates.

Tr. 66.

While Texas remits a portion of fees collected to Utah based on
use of vehicles in Utah, the vehicles are not otherwise registered or titled in Utah.

Tr. 65.

In fact, the Utah Motor Vehi-

cle Act specifically exempts "interstate commercial vehicles duly
registered in another state and not owned by a resident of the
state" from the "registration and certificate of title provisions
of this chapter."

See Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-19(1) (a).

Being

exempt from titling or registration requirements, when the vehicles were

transferred

to BJ-Titan

there was no re-titling or

re-registration of the vehicles in Utah.

All titling and regis-

tration was done in Texas, as assets of Texas entities.
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Because the motor vehicles transferred to BJ-Titan are
not required to be titled or registered

in Utah, these assets,

along with the other assets transferred to BJ-Titan, fall outside
the scope of a "retail sale" as an isolated or occasional sale
and are not subject to taxation.
Notwithstanding

the fact the motor vehicles were not

registered or titled in Utah, the vehicles were transferred pursuant to a "business reorganization" and therefore qualify as an
isolated or occasional sale.

Utah Code S 59-15-2(5) provides, in

part:
that any transfer of any motor vehicle in a
business reorganization where the ownership
of the transferee organization is substantially the same as to the ownership of the
transferor organization shall be considered
an isolated or occasion sale.
(Emphas i s added.)
The terms "business reorganization" and "substantially
the same" are not defined by statute, rule or case law.

However,

the purpose of the "business reorganization" rule is clear; i.e.,
to not tax the transfer of motor vehicles to a new entity where
the original owner continues his proprietary ownership interest
in the motor vehicles vis-a-vis the new entity.

In other words,

where the formal structure of an entity carrying out a business
operation

has

changed,

but

not

its

underlying

ownership

and

operation, the reorganization of the business entity should not
be treated as a retail sale.

In fact, an argument can be made

that there has not been a sale because the same person, before
and

after

the

transfer,

owns

the

-38-

same

assets.

Nothing

has

changed.

17

There has been no consideration for a sale to have

taken place.

For example, Utah Code S 59-15-2(2) (1985-1986)

specifically provides that:
An even exchange of tangible personal properties shall not be deemed a sale for purposes
of this act, but in any transaction wherein
tangible personal property is taken as part
of the sales price of other tangible personal
property, the balance valued in money or
other consideration shall be deemed a sale.
(Emphasis added).

The statute seems to say when there

is an

exchange of property, the sales tax only applies on that portion
of the transaction where a taxpayer has "sold" his property and
received

cash

or other

consideration.

In the present

case,

BJ-Titan could argue that no sale has taken place because the
only thing it received was a proprietary
property it transferred.
While

"business

interest in the very

There was no sale for cash.
reorganization"

is

not

statutorily

defined, a "reorganization" is a technical term with a specific
meaning.

The most common and prevailing reference to the reorga-

nization of a business is that found in the tax laws.

In fact,

the Commission consulted the tax laws in attempting to define

17

See IBEC Industries, Inc. v. Lindley, 405 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio
1980) (the reorganization of a corporation by contributing the
assets and liabilities of a division in exchange for stock of a
newly-formed subsidiary is not a taxable sale for lack of consideration); and Roberts & Sons, Inc. v. Kosydar, 330 N.E.2d 437
(Ohio 1975) (transfer of partnership assets, including motor
vehicle registered in the name of one of the partners but used in
partnership business, to newly-formed corporation where shareholders maintained same percentage ownership as in partnership
held not a taxable sale for lack of consideration); see also
Northern Telecom Inc. v. Olsen, 679 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn. 1984).
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"substantially the same" under the business reorganization rule.
"[B]etween Joe Zvonik and Don Bosch and I, I'm the one that suggested the 80 percent rule, because it was at least something we
could find in writing

in the I.R.S. Code."

Tr. 241

(emphasis

added) (Testimony of Kenneth Cook, Field Audit Supervisor of the
Commission's Auditing Division).
Reference to the definition of a business reorganization as used

in the tax laws

underlying purpose for not

is most appropriate because the

imposing an income tax on business

reorganizations is the same for not subjecting it to a sales tax;
i.e., a business reorganization should not be subject to tax if
there is a continuation of the business enterprise under a modified form and the owners have a continued participation
entity's control, earnings and assets.

in the

Continuity of propriety

interest is the linchpin of non-taxation because as long as ownership continues in the same person, there has been no sale or
transfer of ownership.

18

Thus an appropriate interpretation of

the term "business reorganization" would be those business transactions which are statutorily treated

as non-taxable

sales or

exchanges because to qualify as a tax-free incorporation or reorganization there must exist continuity of proprietary interest.
The Commission's view on what may qualify as a business
reorganization is inconsistent and nonsensical.

On one hand, the

Commission seems to agree that a "business reorganization" should

See footnote 14 above.
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be defined as used in the tax laws (Tr. at 241), but then takes a
position inconsistent with the tax definition of a business reorganization.

For example, the Commission ruled as a conclusion of

law that:
Two business entities transferring assets to
form and organize a new legal entity does not
constitute
a
business
reorganization.
Instead, the two original entities have
formed a new and separate entity.
Record at 58.
This is the technical description of a consolidation;
i.e., "the combination of two or more corporations into a newly
19
created entity."
Thus the Commission, as a matter of law,
ruled that consolidations are not business reorganizations.

How-

ever, the definition of a "reorganization" as established in Utah
Code

S

59-7-115(9)(a)
20
consolidations:

(emphasis

added)

specifically

includes

(a) "Reorganization" means:
(1st)
a merger or consolidation (including
the acquisition by one corporation of at
least a majority of the voting stock and at
least a majority of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock of
another corporation, or substantially all the
properties of another corporation);

19

See Bittker and Eustice, Federal Taxation of Corporations
and Shareholders, page 14-32, Fifth Edition (Abridged Student
Edition).
20

Reference to I.R.C. S 368(a)(1) would likewise be appropriate as the state code follows the federal reorganization
provisions.
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A second inconsistency in the Commission's treatment of
what qualifies as a business reorganization is found in its decision on what constitutes "substantially the same" in a business
reorganization.

The Commission ruled that a 72% interest

in a

new entity following a business reorganization does not consti21
tute "substantially the same."
On behalf of the Commission's
Auditing Division, Mr. Cook testified that 80% was the threshold
level to constitute "substantially the same" "because it was at
least something that we could find in writing in the IRS Code."
Tr. 241.

While BJ-Titan agrees that there are various 80 percent

rules in the IRS Code, as applied to the mainstay of business
reorganizations;

i.e., the statutory merger, there

test as an 80 percent rule.

is no such

The Court need look no further than

Utah Code S 59-7-115(9) (a), cited above, to see that a business
may go through a reorganization in the form of a merger and the
applicable

threshold

control

level

is majority

control

(over

50%).
Two important
must

be emphasized.

legal points concerning

One, a reorganization

reorganizations

of a business may

qualify as a reorganization when only a majority ownership inter. .
.
22
est is retained in the surviving legal entity.
Two, it is

21

BJ Hughes Holding Company owned a 72% interest in BJ-Titan
after the business reorganization.
22

See I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568 which similarly
requires a 50% equity ownership in the new entity to maintain a
continuity of proprietary interest.
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possible to have two transferor entities in a reorganization, in
which case the test for control is done on a combined basis.
Utah Code S 59-7-115(9) (a) (1st) and (2nd).

See

This is especially

true with respect to the tax-free incorporation of a corporation
or formation of a partnership.

See S 59-7-115(2)(e).

As to partnerships, the Utah Code adopts and follows
the

federal

partnership;

treatment
23

as

to

the

tax-free

formation

of

a

thus I.R.C. S 721 (emphasis added) is applicable

and provides the following:
No gain or loss shall
partnership or to any of
case of a contribution
partnership in exchange
the partnership.

be recognized to a
its partners in the
of property to the
for an interest in

The present case is in reality a business reorganization in the form of a consolidation.

BJ-Hughes Holding Company

transferred its entire line of business operations and Titan Services transferred its entire line of business operations to create BJ-Titan.

Because

the original

business operations have continued
interest

therein,

there

is

no

owners of the underlying

their proprietary

reason

why

this

ownership

restructuring

should fall outside the scope of a business reorganization.

This

type of contribution of business operations to a new entity is
exactly the type of business reorganization that Mr. Cook testified was intended to be exempt from sales tax.

23

See Tr. at 240.

See Sections 59-10-301, 59-10-112 and 59-10-103(2).
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IV.

THE AUDITING DIVISION FOLLOWED A POLICY OF
TAXING MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSFERS ON AN AGGREGATE BASIS.
In

the

alternative

to Argument

III

above, BJ-Titan

maintains that in 1985, (and previously), the Commission followed
a policy
basis.

of taxing motor vehicle

transfers on an "aggregate"

Calon Kay Anderson, a former Assistant Director of the

Commission's

Auditing

Division, testified

that such

a policy,

albeit informal, did exist, and was followed by the Commission
for a number of years.

Tr. 159-160.

Under the "aggregate" rule,

a sales tax is assessed on the value of assets transferred to a
partnership based on the non-contributing partner's equity ownership in the partnership.

In other words, since BJ Hughes Holding

Company had a 72% ownership interest in the BJ-Titan partnership,
it (or BJ-Titan as its successor) should have paid sales taxes on
28% of the value of vehicles transferred to BJ-Titan, under the
"aggregate" rule.

Implementation of the "entity"

rule, later

imposed by the Auditing Division without the benefit of a rule
change, would
transferred.

tax BJ-Titan on 100% of

the value of

vehicles

See Tr. 242-243.

Notwithstanding unchallenged testimony, the Commission
ruled

that "the opinion testimony of the Petitioner's witness

[Mr. Anderson] was

insufficient to establish that such policy

[the "aggregate" rule] did indeed exist."

Record at 63.

Even

assuming the Commission had latitude to disregard Mr. Anderson's
testimony, it flatly ignored the documentary evidence to the same
effect presented at the Formal Hearing.
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Exhibit 5 (Record at

226-227) is Mr, Anderson's memorandum to the Commissioners, dated
January

21, 1986 —

written while Mr. Anderson was still an

employee of the Commission as Assistant Director to the Auditing
Division.

In this memorandum Mr. Anderson states:
The Auditing Division has maintained a policy
of exempting the fair market value of the
vehicle multiplied by the contributing partner's ownership interest or conversely we
have taxed the portion of the value of the
vehicle transferred to the other partners.
* * * *

2,
Is our policy of taxing a portion of the
fair market value based on ownership interest
correct?
This memorandum clearly established the existence of such a policy, which was also acknowledged in an Attorney General Informal
Opinion issued in 1986.

Record at 228.

Again the evidence was

uncontroverted, and again the Commission cavalierly ignored it.
V.

THE COMMISSION CANNOT MAKE A CHANGE IN POLICY
WITHOUT A RULEMAKING PROCEEDING.
In the alternative to Argument III above, and assuming

the Court rules in favor of BJ-Titan under Argument IV above,
BJ-Titan argues as follows.

As to motor vehicles in a business

reorganization, vehicles transferred will not be subject

to a

sales tax to the extent the ownership of the transferee organization

is

"substantially

transferor organization.

the

same"

as

the

ownership

of

the

While "substantially the same" is not

defined, the Commission's Auditing Division followed the "aggregate" rule, which is explained in Part IV of this brief, until
1986 when an Attorney General's opinion recommended a change from
-45-

the "aggregate" rule to the "entity" rule.

As to BJ-Titan, the

Auditing Division changed its practice to an "entity" rule, which
exempts only transfers where a single transferor maintains an 80%
level of ownership in the transferee entity.

In other words, BJ

Hughes Holding Company (or BJ-Titan as its successor) was taxed
upon 100% of the value of the vehicles transferred to BJ-Titan
because

BJ Hughes Holding
24
BJ-Titan business.

Company

owns

less

than

80% of

the

The Commission's change from an "aggregate" rule to an
"entity" rule clearly constituted a change in policy as applied
not

just

to

BJ-Titan,

but

to

all

taxpayers.

BJ-Titan

was

adversely impacted by this change in tax policy because it had to
pay tax on 100% of the value of vehicles transferred to the partnership (under the "entity" rule) rather than upon 28% (under the
"aggregate" rule).
Administrative

As required by Utah case law and the Utah

Rulemaking

Act,

the Commission

cannot

lawfully

change those policies, which substantially impact taxpayers without following rulemaking procedures.

See Utah Code S 63-46a-l et

sea.; Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 757 P.2d 882 (Utah
1988); Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah
1986).

Consequently,

implementation

of

this

change

cannot

lawfully be imposed upon BJ-Titan.

24

BJ-Titan is a Texas general partnership.
In forming
BJ-Titan, BJ Hughes Holding Company contributed 72% of the
assets, including the motor vehicles at issue, and received a 72%
interest in BJ-Titan.
Titan Services contributed 28% of the
assets. See Statement of Facts, H 21 and 22.
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CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission1s Final Decision should be reversed
because

it

fails

to

apply

established

law

to

uncontroverted

facts.
The facts are that BJ-Titan sells oil well stimulation
services which are not incidental to its sale of tangible property.
not

The Commission should have ruled that such services are

taxable.

In the alternative,

the Commission

should have

ruled, again on the basis of uncontroverted facts, that BJ-Titan
is a real property contractor who should have paid sales taxes to
its vendors on its material cost and should not have collected
sales taxes from its customers on the cost of materials and services.

Finally, the Tax Commission should have ruled that the

transfer of vehicles

to BJ-Titan

in a business

reorganization

either did not constitute a sale or was an "isolated or occasional" sale, and thus was outside the definition of a "retail
sale" and the application of a sales tax.
DATED this 19th day of November, 1990.

MAXWELL A. MILLER
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW
RICHARD M. MARSH
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
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APPENDIX A

59-15-2.
As used in this chapter:
( 0 ' 'Person* includes any individual, firm copartnership, joint adventure, corporation, estate or
trust, or any group or combination acting as a unit
and the plural as well as the singular number unless
the intention to give a more limited meaning is
disclosed by the context.
(2) 'Sale* or 'sales* includes installment and
credit sales, every closed transaction constituting a
sale, and also includes the sale of electrical energy,
gas, sen ices, or entertainment taxable under the
terms of this act. A transaction whereby the possession of property is transferred but the seller retains
the ntle as security for the payment of the price
shall be deemed a sale. An even exchange of
tangible personal properties shall not be deemed a
sale for purposes of this act, but in any transaction
wherein tangible personal property is taken as pan
pf *\** « al '* Dnce of other tangible personal
property, the balance valued in money or other coT"
nsideraoon shall be deemed a sale.
(3) 'Wholesaler* means a person doing a
regularly organized wholesale or jobbing business
and selling to retail merchants, jobbers, dealers or
other wholesalers, for the purpose of resale.
(4) 'Wholesale* means a sale of tangible personal
property by wholesalers to retail merchants,
jobbers, dealers or other wholesalers for resale, and
does not include a sale by wholesalers or retailers to
users or consumers not for resale, except as
otherwise specified.
(5) 'Retailer' means a person doing a regularly
organized retail business in tangible personal
property, and selling to the user or consumer and
not for resale, and includes commission merchants,
auctioneers, and all persons regularly engaged in the
business of selling to users or consumers within the
state of Utah; but the term 'retailer* does not
include farmers, gardeners, stockmen, pouitrymen
or other growers or agricultural producer!
producing and domg business on their own
premises, except those who are regularly engaged in
the business of buying or selling for a profit. The
term 'retail sale* means every sale within the state
of Utah by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or
consumer, except sales defined as wholesale sales or
otherwise exempted by the terms of this act; but the
term 'retail sale' is not intended to include isolated
nor occasional sales by persons not regularly
engaged in business, nor seasonal sales of crops,
seedling plants, garden or farm or other agricultural
produce by the producer thereof, or the return to
the producer thereof of processed agricultural
products, but no sale of a vehicle of a type required
to be registered under the provisions of the motor
vehicle laws of this state shall be deemed isolated or
occasional for the purposes of this act, except that
any transfer of any motor vehicle in a business reorganization where the ownership of the transferee
organization is substantially the same as to the
ownership of the transferor organization shall be
considered an isolated or occasional sale. Any
fanner or other agricultural producer who sells
poultry, eggs or dairy products to consumers will be
deemed to be a retailer making retail sales and such
sales will not be exempt under the provisions of this
act if such sales have an average monthly sales
value of $125 or more.

(6) Each purchase of tangible personal property
or product made by a person engaged in the
business of manufacturing, compounding for sale,
profit or use, any article, substance or commodity,
which enters into and becomes an ingredient or
component pan of the tangible personal property or
product which he manufactures, or compounds, and
the container, label or the shipping case thereof,
shall be deemed a wholesale sale and shall be
exempt from taxation under this act; and for the
purpose of this act, poultry, dairy and other
livestock feed, and the components thereof,
including all baling ties and twine used in the baling
of hay and straw and all fuel used for heating
orchards, commercial greenhouses, domg a majority
of their business in wholesale sales, and providing
power for off highway type farm machinery, and all
seeds and seedlings, are deemed to become
component parts of the eggs, milk, meat and other
livestock products, plants and plant products,
produced for resale; and each purchase of such feed
or seed from a wholesaler, or retailer, as well as
from any other person shall be deemed a wholesale
j a k and shall be exempt from taxation under this
act; provided also that sprays and insecticides used
in the control of insect pests, diseases and weeds for
the commercial production of fruit, vegetables,
feeds, seeds, and animal products shall be deemed a
wholesale sale and exempt from taxation under this
act;
Each purchase of service as defined in section 5915-4(b) by a person engaged m compounding and
selling a service which is subject to a tax under
section 59-!5-4(b) and actually used in compounding such taxable service shall be deemed a wholesale
sale and shall be exempt from taxation under this
act.
(7) When right to possession, operation, or use of
any arode of tangible personal property is granted
under a lease or contract and such transfer of possession would be taxable if an outright sale were
made, such lease or contract shall be considered the
sale- of such article and the tax shall be computed
and paid by the vendor or lessor upon the rentals
paid, regardless of the duration of the lease or
contract.
(8) 'Tax' means either the tax payable by the
purchaser of a commodity or service subject to tax,
or the aggregate amount of taxes due from the
vendor of such commodities or services during the
period for which he is required to repon his collections, as the context may require.
(9) 'Admission' includes seats and tables reserved
or otherwise, and other similar accommodations
and charges made therefor and 'amount paid for
admission' means the amount paid for such admission, exclusive of any admission tax imposed by the
federal government or by tins act.
(10) 'Purchase' means the price to the consumer
exclusive of any tax imposed by the federal government or by this act.
(11) 'Motion picture exhibitor' means any person
engaged in the business of operating a theatre or
establishment in which motion, pictures are exhibited
regularly to the public for a charge.
isti

59-15-4. Saks tax - Rase - Disposition of revesuse
froaa temporary increase.

From and after the effective date of this act there
is levied and there shall be collected and paid:
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible
personal property made within the state of Utah
equivalent to the following rates: (i) 4 - 5 / 8 * from
October 1, 1983, through June 30, 1986, (ii) 43 8 / 6 4 * from July 1, 1986, through December 31,
1989, and (iv) 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1, 1990, and
thereafter of the purchase price paid or charged,
except that where a person takes, as a trade-in for
part payment of the merchandise sold, tangible
personal property other than money, that tax shall
be computed and paid only upon the net difference
between the selling price of the merchandise sold
and the amount of the trade-in allowance. For the
purpose of this subsection, currency and coinage
constituting legal tender of the United States or of a
foreign nation, all sales of gold, silver, or platinum
ingots, bars, medallions, or decorative coins, not
constituting legal tender of any nation, with a gold,
silver, or platinum content of not less than 8 0 *
shall not be considered tangible personal property.
The sale of coal, fuel oU, and other fuels shall not
be subject to the tax except as hereinafter provided^
(b) A tax equivalent to the following percentages of the amount paid:
(1) 4 - 5 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June
30, 1986.
3 8 / 6 4 * from July 1, 1986, through
December i l , 1989, and 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to common
carriers or telephone or telegraph corporations as
defined by Section 54-2-1, whether the corporations
are municipally or privately owned, for all transportation, telephone service, or telegraph service; but
the tax shall not apply to intrastate movements of
freight and express or to street railway fares or to
the sale of newspapers and newspaper subscriptions.
(2) 4 - 5 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June
30, 1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to any
person as defined in this act including municipal
corporations, for gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil,
or other fuels sold or furnished for commercial consumption. For purposes of this Subsection (b),
commercial consumption shall not include the
amounts of these fuels sold or furnished to
apartment houses or other similar buildings where
persons maintain their places of r e r i d e ^ J ^ o n r y
TOine extent these fuels are used for these places of
residence.
(3) 1-5/8* from October 1, 1983, through June
30, 1986, 1-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and 1-1/2* from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to any
person as defined in this act, including municipal
corporations, for gat, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil,
or other fuds sold or furnished for domestic or residential use, including use by persons residing in
apartment houses or similar buildings.
(c) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 45 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30,
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid for all
nasals furnished by any restaurant, eating house,
hotel, drugstore, dub, or other place.
(d) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 45 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30,
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid for
admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation.

(e) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 45 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30,
1986, 4-38/64* from Jury 1, 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid or charged
for all services for repairs, renovations, cleaning, or
washing of tangible personal property or for installation of tangible personal property rendered in
connection with other tangible personal property.
(0 A tax equivalent to the following rates: 45 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30,
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1( 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid or charged
for tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and services. This subsection shall not
apply to the amount paid or charged for tourist
home, motel, hotel, or trailer court where residency
is maintained continuously under the terms of a
tease or similar agreement for a period of not less
than 30 days.
(g) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 45 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30,
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid or charged
for laundry and dry cleaning services.
(h) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 45 / 8 * from October 1, 1983, through June 30,
1986, 4-38/64* from July 1, 1986, through
December 31, 1989, and 4 - 1 / 2 * from January 1,
1990, and thereafter of the amount paid or charged
for leases and rentals of tangible personal property,
when situs of the property is in this state, or if the
lessee took possession in this, state; provided,
however, the tax need not be paid if the leased
properly is used exclusively in a foreign state.
TTie revenue collected from (i) a 1 / 8 * increase in
sales tax from July 1, 1983, through June 30, 1986,
shall be deposited in the General Fund RestrictedExecutive Reserve Account, and (ii) a 6 / 6 4 *
increase in sales tax from July l t 1986, through
December 31, 1989, shall be deposited in the Water
Resources Conservation and Development Fund, ues
59-15-4.6. AppfopriatkHi of reresme to 1965 Utah
So .much of the sales tax revenue collected
pursuant to this act as is necessary to pay the
interest on and retire the principal of bonds authorized by the Thirty-Sixth Legislature for the
programs prescribed in House Bill number 64 [ch.
133] of the Thirty-Sixth Legislature [63-32-1 to 6332-21] to be conducted by the Utah state building
board and Utah park and recreation commission
shall be appropriated to the 1965. Utah building
bonds interest and sinking fund [63-32-8] to make
such payments of interest and principal in accordance with the payment schedule prescribed in said
bonds. Provided, however, this section will not
become operable unless and until other funds appropriated by the legislature for the purposes of this
section have been exhausted.
im

R865-01S. Sales and Use Taxes
Distinguished Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Title 59, Chapter 12
M f * 4 1 S - l . Stfttt aae Use Tax

A^Ihe^aiestax is imposed upon saka of tangible
peraonai property made within the state of Utah*
regardless of where such property u intended to be
used, and on the amount paid or charged for all
services for repairs and renovations of tangible
personal property or for installation of tangible
peraonai property rendered in connection with other
tangible personal property.
B. The use tax is imposed upon the_user storage
or other consumption of tangible personal property,
and upon the amount paid or charged for the services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal
property or installation of tangible personal property m connection with other tangible personal
property, if the tangible personal property is for
ttse^ storage, or consumption m Utah; and, orchnariry, if the transaction does not take place within the
state of Utah.
C . The two taxes are compensating taxes, one
supplementing the other, but both cannot be applicable to the same transaction. The rate of tax is the
D. The distinguishing factor in determining which
tax at applicable is normally the place where the sale
or service takes place. If the sale is made far Utah,
the sales tax applies. If the sale is made elsewhere,
theuse tax applies.
ttST 5*12

RK5-02S. Nature of Tax Pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103
MB42S.1. SsJ« aa* Ust Tti

RS*5-02S-1. Sales and Use Tax
A ~ t h e sales and use taxes are transaction taxes
hnposfd upon certain retail sales and leases of tangible personal property, as well as upon certain
services.
B.*The tax is not upon the articles sold or furnished,- but upon the transaction, and the purchaser is
the actual taxpayer. The vendor is charged with the
duty of collecting the tax from the purchaser and of
paying the tax to the state.
\S** 9M2-M3

RS65-26S. Tangible Personal Property
Defined Pursuant to Utah Code Arm.
859-12-11*
RM*-2*SrL Sate tadUst Tax
BM5-26S-1. Sales and Use Tax
A, Tangible personal property* means all goods,
wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities, all
tangible or corporeal things and substances which
are dealt in or capable of being possessed or exchanged. It does not include real estate or any interest
therein, bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages,
notes and other evidence of debt, coins and currency, insurance policies, or governmental licenses.
The term does not include water in pipes, conduits,
ditches* or rescnroks but doer include water m
bottles, tanks, or other containers. Tangible pert*
onal property includes all other physkaQy existing
articles or things, indnrimg property severed from
real estate.
IM7 S*-tt~US

RK5-27S. Retail Saks Defined Pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §59-12-102
RM9-r7S-l. Sates avi Uat To:

Rj*5-27S-1. Saks and Use Ttx
A«*The term 'retail fate* has a broader meaning
fiasrthesaierof-tangftfe personal property. It indodea any traaaferty earriiangn, orr barter -whether
cnaaffliiaiai or for* consideration by a person doinf
bipnien in such^^convncNin^or^servicc; either as a
regularly organized principal endeavor or as-an?
adjunct thereto. The price of the service or tangiblepcrjonal property, the Quantity sold, or the extant
of'the* clientele are not factors which determine
whether ornot it if* retail sale*B^Retail sale aba includes certain leases and
rentals of tangible personal property as defined in
Rule R865-32S, accemnxictaions as defined In
Role RS65-79S,~ services performed on tangible
personal property as defined in Rules R865-51&
and R863-78S, admissions as defined in Rules
R865-33S and R865-34S sales of meals as defined
in-Rules RS65-61S and R865-62S, and sates of
certain public utility services.
C. A particular retail sale or portion of the setting
price may not be subject to a sates or use tax. The
status of the exemption is governed by the ctrcumstaaces in each case.- See other rules for specific and
general exemption definitions* Rule R865-30S for
definition of sates price and Rule R86S-72S covering trade-ins.
Iff? 3M2-1S2

R865-38S. Isolated and Occasional Sales
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§59-12-106
RS65-38S-1. Sales and Use Tax

R865-38S-1. Sales and Use Tax
A. Sales made by officers of a court, pursuant to
court orders, are occasional sales, with the exception
of sales made by trustees, receivers, assignees and
the like, in connection with the liquidation or
conduct of a regularly established place of business.
Examples of casual sales are those made by sheriffs
in foreclosing proceedings and sales of confiscated
property.
B. If a sale is an integral pan of a business whose
primary function is not the sale of tangible personal
property, then such sale is not isolated or occasional. For example, the sale of repossessed radios,
refrigerators, etc., by a finance company is not
isolated or occasional.
C Sales of vehicles subject to the registration
laws of this state are not isolated or occasional
sales, except that any transfer of any motor vehicle
in a business reorganization where the ownership of
the transferee organization is substantially the same
as the ownership of the transferror organization
shall be considered an isolated or occassional sale.
D. Isolated or occasional sales made by persons
not regularly engaged in business are not subject to
the tax. The word "business" refers to an enterprise
engaged in seiling tangible personal property or
taxable services notwithstanding the fact that the
sales may be few or infrequent. Any sale of an
entire busmess to a single buyer is an isolated or
occasional sale and no tax applies to the sale of any
assets made part of such a sale (with the exception
of vehicles subject to registration).
E. The sale of used fixtures, machinery, and
equipment items is not an exempt occasional sale if
the sale is one of a senes of sales sufficient in
number, amount, and character to indicate the seller
deals in the sale of such items.
F Sales of items at public auctions do not qualify
as exempt isolated or occasional sales.
G. Wholesalers, manufacturers, and processors
who primarily sell at other than retail are not
making isolated or occasional sales when they sell
such tangible personal property for use or consumption.
1917 59-11-104

R865-58S. Materials and Supplies Sold
to Owners, Contractors and Repairmen
of Real Property Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§59-12-102 and 59-12-103
BNS6SS-1. Saks tad Use T o
RSC5-58S-L Saki and Use Tax
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real
property contractors and repairmen of real property
is generally subject to tax.
1. The person who converts the personal property
into real property is the consumer of the personal
property since he is the last one to own it as personal property.
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or
repair real property; regardless of the type of contract entered into - whether it is a lump sum, time
and material, or a cost-plus contract.
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the
tax nor is the labor performed on real property. For
example, the sale of a completed home or building
is not subject to the tax, but sales of materials and
supplies to contractors and subcontractors are
taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. This
is true whether the contract is performed for an
individual, a religious institution, or a governmental
instrumentality.
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable
institutions and government agencies are exempt
only, if sold as tangible personal property and the
seller does not install the material as an improvement to realty or use it to repair real property.
B. If the contractor or repairman purchases all
materials and supplies from vendors who collect the
Utah tax, no sales tax license is required unless the
contractor makes direct sales of tangible personal
property in addition to the work on real property.
1. If direct sales are made, the contractor shall
obtain a sales tax license and collect tax on all sales
of tangible personal property to final consumers.
2. The contractor must accrue and report tax on
all merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing contracts to improve or repair real property.
Books and records must be kept to account for both
material sold and material consumed.
C. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors
for use in out-of-state jobs are taxable unless
sold in interstate commerce in accordance with Rule
R865-44S.
D. This rule does not apply to contracts whereby
the retailer sells and installs personal property which
does not become part of the real property. See Rules
R865-51S, R865-39S, and R865-78S for information dealing with installation and repair of tangible personal property.
Iff?
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APPENDIX B

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

BJ-TITAN SERVICES & HUGHES TOOL CO.,
Petitioner,
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent

)
:
)
:
)
:

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND FINAL DECISION
Appeal No.

88-1644

:

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for
a formal hearing on February 21, 1989.

James E. Harward, Hearing

Officer, Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner and G. Blaine Davis,
Commissioner heard the matter for and in behalf of the Tax
Commission.
Present and representing the Petitioner was Maxwell A.
Miller, Attorney at Law.

Present and representing the Respondent

was Brian Tarbet, Assistant Attorney General.
The appeal represented the consolidation of two cases:
Hughes Tool Company v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission, appeal No. 88-1500; and BJ-Titan Services Company v.

Appeal No. 88-1644

Auditing Division of theJJtah State Tax Commission, appeal No.
88-1644.

The identical nature of the issues involved in the two

cases made the consolidation practical.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is sales tax.

2.

Pursuant to the audit of Hughes Tool Company for the

period October 1, 1983 through March 31, 1985, the Auditing
Division assessed additional sales and use tax in the amount of
$239,842.89.
3.

Pursuant to an audit of BJ-Titan Services Company

for the period of April 1, 1985 through September 30, 1986, the
Auditing Division assessed additional sales and use tax in the
amount of $116,574.11.
4.

Petitioners operate oil and gas well stimulation and

stabilization services encompassing these types of services:

5.

(1)
(2)
(3)

Cementing;
Acidizing;
Fracturing;

(4)

Nitrogen work.

Cementing involves the placement of various

cementing compositions, fluids, and slurry compositions, into
various places in the well.

The purpose of cementing is to

stabilize the well and/or to separate zones within the well hole.
6.

Hydraulic fracturing involves the injection of

hydraulic fluids that are created with various additives
-2-
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into a well bore to extend the well bore laterally into the
formation.
7.

Acidizing is an extension of hydraulic fracturing

using hydrochloric acid in combination with other agents to
improve the flow capacity of a well by dissolving deposits that
may be plugging channels in the rock.
8.

In cementing, a special grade of Portland Cement is

used with any combination of 54 additives, the use of which is
dependent upon the conditions of the well.

The actual formula of

the cement used for each well is recommended by Petitioner's
representative.
9.

Without the expertise of the employees of the

Petitioner, the raw chemicals or cement are of little value to the
well operators, and likewise the services are of little value to
the well operators without the raw materials.
10.

Because neither the materials nor the services are

of much value to the customers without the other, it is not
important to the customer how the price is allocated between the
materials and the services.
the other.

The customer does not buy one without

Therefore, if only the materials were taxable tben

BJ-Titan could reduce the taxes by simply reallocating the price
from materials to services.
11.

The customer is purchasing the final product in the

hole where it has its only value to the customer.

The final

product has value to the customers of BJ-Titan only after the
materials and services together have been provided to the
customers.
-3-
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12.
purchased.

Petitioner did not pay sales tax on materials it
Petitioner charged sales tax to its customers on the

materials and remitted that amount to the State Tax Commission.
The Petitioner did not charge sales tax on the portion of its
invoice price which it claims was the labor portion.
13.

Concerning cementing services, BJ-Titan synthesizes

materials and services to provide a finished product which
stabilizes the pipe located in the well.
cannot be removed.

Once poured, the cement

The cement permanently affixes the casing to

the surrounding hole and becomes real property.
14.

When BJ-Titan delivers the products to the well

operators, BJ-Titan makes its recommendations regarding the
precise formulas to be used and the method of placement in the
well.

However, the well operators make the decisions to accept or

reject the recommendations of BJ-Titan.
specific provision which states:

The contracts contain a

"work done by BJ-Titan shall be

under the direction, supervision and control of the owner,
operator, or his agent and BJ-Titan will perform the work as an
independent contractor and not as an employee or agent of the
owner or operator.::

Thus, it is the well operators (customers of

BJ-Titan) that convert the materials (cement) acquired from
BJ-Titan into real property.
15.

The cementing services of BJ-Titan are similar to a

ready mix concrete company that sells concrete to a building
contractor and pumps it to the location where it is needed by the

-4-
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contractor.

In that case, as well as this case, the delivered

product is subject to sales tax on the total charge, including the
sellers cost for materials, labor and profit.

In the case of a

ready mix company selling and pumping concrete to a building
contractor, when the concrete is converted to real property it is
converted by the building contractor and not by the ready mix
company.

In this case, when the cement is converted to real

property it is converted by the oil well owner and not by
B.J.-Titan.
16.

In contrast to the cementing function, acidizing,

fracturing, and nitrogen services are not operations in which the
involved personal property becomes part of or attached to real
property.

In each of these services the personal property used in

stimulation becomes part of the production of the well and is
returned when oil and other fluids are taken from the well.

In

these cases, BJ-Titan has sold the products to the final consumer,
and sales tax should have been collected on that sale to the final
consumer.
17.

In April 1985, Hughes Tool Company, through its

holding company, BJ-Kughes Holding Company, and Titan Services
Company, combined to form a partnership known as BJ-Titan Services
Company.

BJ-Hughes Holding Company contributed 72% of the new

partnership's assets including the contribution of the motor
vehicles in question.
the assets.

Titan Services Company contributed 28% of

BJ-Hughes received a 71% interest in the partnership,

and Titan Services received a 28% interest in the partnership.
-5-
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Tax
Commission now makes and enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There is a tax levied on the purchaser for the amount

paid for retail sales of tangible personal property made within
the state.
2.

(Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103)
Sales of tangible personal property to real property

contractors and repairmen of real property are subject to sales
tax.
3.

Sales of vehicles required to be titled or registered

within the laws of this state are not exempt from sales taxes as
isolated or occasional sales, except that any transfer of a
vehicle in a business reorganization where the ownership of the
transferee organization is substantially the same as the ownership
of the transferrer organization shall be considered an isolated or
occasional sale.

(Utah State Tax Commission Administrative Rule

R845-19-38S(c).)
4.

Two business entities Transferring assets to form and

organize a new legal entity does not constitute a business
reorganization.

Instead, the two original entities have formed a

new and separate entity.
5.

BJ-Titan is not a real property contractor within the

meaning of R86 5-19-58S.

Instead, the portion of its product

which BJ-Titan has labeled as services is really charges "for

-6-
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fabrication or installation which is part of the process of
creating a finished article of tangible personal property" (the
cement which is sold to the well operators) pursuant to
R865-19-51S.
ISSUES
In both cases there are essentially two issues to be
decided:
1.

Is sales and use tax imposed on all of the charges

made by B-J Titan and Hughes Tool, or only on the portion of the
charges which they have allocated to materials?
2.

Is the transfer of motor vehicles to BJ-Titan

Services from BJ-Hughes Holding Company exempt from sales and use
tax?
IS THE SALES AND USE TAX IMPOSED ON THE TOTAL
INVOICE PRICE FROM BJ-TITAN TO ITS CUSTOMERS,
OR ONLY ON THE AMOUNT WHICH BJ-TITAN HAS
DESIGNATED AS THE PORTION ALLOCABLE TO MATERIALS?
In support of its position that the services are not
subject to sales or use tax, the Petitioner advances two
alternative theories:
1.

The services are not incidental to the sale of

tangible personal property.

Rather, services rendered are part of

a comprehensive service and the sale of concrete or other well
stimulation materials are incidental to that comprehensive service;
2.

The Petitioner is a real property contractor and is

exempt from sales and use taxes, except for sales tax on the
products which it purchases.
-7-
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With respect to the Petitioner's argument that the
services are not incidental to the sale of the materials used to
case the wells and materials used in stimulating the wells, the
Tax Commission finds the argument is not well taken.
While it is accepted that without the expertise provided
by the Petitioner the materials are virtually worthless for their
intended purpose, it is also accepted, as the Respondent in its
brief states that "All of Petitioner's 'services' without the
actual materials would be worthless to its customers.

Likewise

the materials without the services to blend them into the correct
product and deliver it into the property would likewise be of for
(sic) less value.

It is the synthesis of these two things that

comprise the product, the tangible personal property and
associated services that Petitioner transfers to its customers.
It is this synthesis of material and services that is subject to
sales tax" (brief of Respondent page 7).
Where the Petitioner is in the business of oil and gas
stimulation, the Petitioner operates as a retailer of tangible
personal property.

The services that it provides to its customers

in the sale of these products is a necessary component of the
final product and is taxable.
This rationale is consistent with the decision of the
Utah Supreme Court in McKendrick v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah
2nd 418, 347 P2d 177, (1959).

There, the plaintiff, a

manufacturer of artificial limbs, claimed the sale of artificial
limbs were exempt from sales tax.
-8-
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what he was selling was a professional service in the making and
fitting of the prosthetic devices and the materials used were such
a small portion of the total charge that they were "merely
incidental" to the service performed.
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed with the Petitioner and
stated:
It is quite generally true that "materials",
considered separate and apart from "services",
are not worth much. The value of raw materials
depends upon their abundance or scarcity.
These are usually very small in comparison to
the products into which they are fashioned.
Its the taking of ore from the mine or the tree
from the forest and then making them into
something useful which makes the end product
desirable and therefore valuable.
During the process of transformation through
various stages, the value is steadily enhanced
in proportion to the expense of time, energy
and skill thereon. An excellent example is the
process by which a pound of iron ore, worth but
a few cents, is mined, smelted, processed,
tempered and fabricated into hair springs for
watches worth thousands of dollars per pound.
When one is sold its value is that of the
finished product and not of the basic materials
from which it was made. The same principle
applies to the Petitioner's profits. Id. at
419.
With regard to the Petitioner's second argument that it
is a real property contractor, the Tax Commission similarly
such argument to be without merit.

finds

If the Petitioner were a real

property contractor the sale to them of the materials in question
would be subject to sales tax, and sales tax would be paid by the
Petitioner and not by its customers.
the Petitioner conducted business.

That, however, is not how

Here, the practice of

Petitioner was to not pay sales tax on materials purchased by them
-9-
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but rather, charge its customers sales tax and remit the taxes to
the Tax Commission.

Those actions were not those of a real

property contractor but were those of a retail sales business
which purchased the materials for later resale.
It appears that the Petitioner would now ask that its own
past actions which showed that it did not consider itself to be a
real property contractor be disregarded simply because it is in
its financial interest to do so.

This the Tax Commission is not

willing to do and finds such practice to be probative as to the
true nature of the Petitioner's operation.
IS THE TRANSFER OF MOTOR VEHICLES TO
BJ-TITAN FROM BJ-HUGHES EXEMPT FROM SALES AND USE TAX
Under Utah State Tax Commission Rule

R855-19-38S, sales

of motor vehicles are not exempt as isolated or occasional sales
except "that any transfer of the vehicle in a business
reorganization where the ownership of the transferee organization
is substantially the same as the ownership of the transferrer
organization shall be considered as an isolated or occasional
sale".
In the present case, BJ-Holding Company was created
specifically to hold the assets of BJ-Hughes Services and become a
partner with Titan Services in the formation of the partnership
known as BJ-Titan Services.

BJ-Holding Company contributed 72% of

the assets of the new company including the motor vehicles in
question.

Titan Services contributed the remaining 28% of the

assets.
-10-

Appeal No. 88-1644

Under the facts as set out above, it cannot be said that
the ownership of the

transferee organization (BJ-Titan) is

substantially the same as the ownership of the transferrer
organization (BJ-Holding Company).

Therefore, the Petitioners

have failed to meet the requirements of Rule R865-12-38S with
respect to the transfer of vehicles.
With regard to both issues, the Petitioner claims that
the findings of the Auditing Division were contrary to established
policies of the Tax Commission.

Petitioner argued that the Tax

Commission could not reverse such a policy without complying with
the appropriate administrative rule making statutes.
In support of this, the Petitioner offered the testimony
of a single witness, a former employee of the Tax Commission, who
testified that in his opinion certain policies regarding the two
issues existed.
The Tax Commission finds that the opinion testimony of
the Petitioner's witness was insufficient to establish that such
policy did indeed exist.

More importantly, however, there was no

evidence presented which showed that even if such policies were in
effect, the Petitioner relied upon them to its detriment.
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that
the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence
that its oil and gas stimulation services are exempt from sales
and use tax.

The Tax Commission also finds that the Petitioner

has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Hughes Holding Company to
BJ-Titan Services were exempt from sales and use taxes.
-11-
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findings of the Auditing Division are therefore affirmed,
request of the Petitioner is denied.
DATED this

£

day of

The

It is so ordered.

^uJ*UX^

, 1990.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMITS SIONT

LJoe B. Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have
to file a request
the date of final
judicial review.

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

ten (10) days after the date of the final order
for reconsideration or thirty (30) days after
order to file in Supreme Court a petition for
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13(1), 63-46b-14(2)(a)
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